Sinking of INS Khukri Book Review

I. BACKGROUND & INTRODUCTION
The book entitled The Sinking of INS Khukri (Survivors Stories) tells, in part, the story of what really happened in India in 1971 and the tragic and dramatic tale of the sinking of an Indian anti-submarine frigate (INS Khukri) during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War as unfolded by the survivors and surviving families of the ill-fated Indian warship. First published in 2006 by The Lotus Collection and imprinted by Roli Books Pvt. Ltd. in New Delhi, the book was written by Major General (Retd) Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM some 35 years after the fatal incident had taken place off the coast of Diu Head in the western coast of India claiming the lives of almost 200 officers and sailors of the unfortunate INS Khukri. The books author, General Cardozo, a war veteran himself of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, shares the sentiments and ordeals of his comrades-in-arms in the Indian Navy during the sea battles of this famous and historic war which ended in a resounding and glorious feat for India and the liberation and birth of an independent state of Bangladesh. During this very same war, General Cardozo was a young major then fighting for the 5th Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) against Pakistani soldiers in Sylhet, Bangladesh where he lost his leg in a landmine blast on that very same day that INS Khukri was sunk, 09 December 1971. Despite the tribulation, he conquered his disability and became the first disabled Army Officer to command an infantry battalion and eventually, a brigade. Later on, he became the Chairman of the Rehabilitation Council of India. To a regular serviceman, it may seem ironic that an Army Officer is the one narrating a story, which is truly Navy in nature. However, let it be known that there is a very special bond linking INS Khukri and the Gorkha Rifle Brigade together. General Cardozo, a proud member of this illustrious Gorkha Brigade, related that the special attachment between the officers and men of these two (2) units could be traced all the way back from the 1950s when an Indian River Class Frigate, HMIS Khukri was first commissioned into the naval service. The pact of friendship and brotherhood was sealed during one of the military functions held at the Kotah House Navy Officers Mess when a khukri (a traditional weapon of a Gorkha soldier) was presented by the 5th Gorkha Rifles (FF) to the officers of HMIS Khukri, who in turn presented the regiment with the ships crest. Since then, the two units bond has been indelibly etched in the annals of both the Indian Army and the Indian Navy. Relatedly, this Khukri was one of the effective weapons used by the author himself in fighting the war against Pakistan in the Eastern Front and in cutting off his nearly severed leg after the landmine explosion in Sylhet, a bold move of a gallant soldier determined to live and fight another day.

This 197-page historically descriptive and narrative literature has been carefully taken from sources published both in India and Pakistan, from actual accounts of key personnel during those fateful moments of the battles and those who survived the ordeals of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War.
II. SUMMARY OF CONTENT
As my own way of summarizing the storys vast coverage, shown below are five major tales that linked together all the bits and pieces of information which vividly describe what had really happened in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, the sad fate of INS Khukri and the magnificent victory of India in this decisive battle:
Revisiting the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965. The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 took place between April and September of said year. India and Pakistan fought over the disputed region of Kashmir, the first having been fought in 1947. The war began following Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against Indian rule. However, the scheme was revealed and the Pakistani saboteurs were soon discovered because their presence was eventually reported by the locals of Kashmir. The operation eventually ended in a complete failure. It ended in a United Nations (UN) mandated ceasefire.
This Tales Emphasis. Naval operations did not play a prominent role in this war. Indian governments decision not to involve the Navy permitted Pakistan Navy to willfully and spontaneously carry out a bombardment in Dwarka, which was 200 miles from the port of Karachi. Pakistan was so oozing with self-confidence then because of two main reasons: 1) Pakistan totally believed that India is still handicapped by the recently concluded Sino-Indian War of 1962 and; 2) Pakistan, at that time, was receiving massive military supplies from the US government thereby manifesting her considerable military advantage over India. The bombardment at Dwarka dragged the Indian Navys reputation into its all-time low because of the affront and humiliation it brought to India. The said bombardment, though no substantial damage or loss had been incurred by India, was a significant naval operation of the 1965 war, which led to a subsequent post-war modernization and expansion particularly of the Indian Navy.
Early – Late 1971 (India in the Brink of War). During the early days of 1971, there were many indicators already that Pakistan was preparing for war. One of which was the uncontrollable condition of the effects of Pakistans growing internal and brutal conflicts in her eastern territory, which has sent millions of refugees to India creating more economic and socio-political unrest to the latter. Indira Ghandi, Indias prime minister during that time, made every effort in order to avoid war. Nonetheless, all diplomatic efforts of convincing Pakistan to settle her internal dispute in her eastern front were still to no avail. With this, Indira Ghandi eventually decided to prepare India for War. India already contemplated for a military action in May, but decided to wait until its Army was trained to fight in the unfavorable conditions of East Pakistan. This time, the Navy is joining the war in full throttle. It had already conceived a detailed analysis of the Pakistan Navys sea power and a worthwhile contingency in overcoming such.
This Tales Emphasis. The efforts of Indira Ghandi to exploit all peaceful means as to Pakistans internal conflict is indicative of Indias love for peace and harmony for all. For Indira Ghandi, war was just a desperate move and a last resort. This humane gesture of the prime minister plus Indias willful assumption of responsibilities over the millions of refugees, with whom she has nothing to gain but instead, so much to lose, is a reflection of how India, as a nation, respects and upholds human dignity and freedom.
War Declared (The Indo-Pakistan War of 1971). On the evening of 03 December, at about 1740H, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) launched a pre-emptive strike on various airfields in the northern part of India, including Agra, a run-up to planned Pakistani land offensives against J;K, Punjab and Rajasthan. This was an act that signaled that Pakistan is, once more, at war with India, the mark of the official start of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971. The war lasted with more than 93,000 Pakistani soldiers captured, a region liberated and an independent Bangladesh was born.
This Tales Emphasis. In this particular war, Indias planning and conduct for the various contingencies were well carried out. Cooperation, coordination and interoperability between the armed forces and the civil sectors contributed immensely to good planning and conduct of the war. Troops were also highly motivated and well trained. Indeed, the execution phase of the 1971 war was a clear manifestation of how India had done her homework, and she had done it quite well.

Naval Feats of the 1971 War. In the western theatre of the war, the Indian Navy, under the command of Vice Admiral Kohli, successfully attacked Karachi’s port in Operation Trident on the night of 04 and 05 December. Missile boats were effectively utilized to sink Pakistani destroyer PNS Khyber and a minesweeper PNS Muhafiz. Operation Trident was followed by Operation Python in which Indian missile boats launched a second attack on Karachi port, resulting in further destruction of reserve fuel tanks and the sinking of three Pakistani merchant ships setting up a huge bonfire on Pakistans strategic port. In the eastern theater of the war, the Indian Eastern Naval Command, under Vice Admiral Krishnan, completely isolated East Pakistan by a naval blockade in the Bay of Bengal. Pakistan countered the threat by sending the submarine PNS Ghazi, which sank en route under mysterious circumstances off Vishakapatnam’s coast reducing Pakistan’s control of its eastern coastline.
This Tales Emphasis. The Indian Government has finally applied the lessons it painfully learned in 1965. The Navy, with its full might, took part in this decisive war as a prelude to gaining its pride and glory. The Indian Fleet Forces bold and pounding strikes against her adversary had earned for the Navy that pride and prestige which were once lost due to inaction.
The Ultimate Sacrifice (Sinking of INS Khukri). In the early hours of 09 December, a Pakistani submarine, PNS Hangor picked up two sonar contacts (believed to be that of INS Khukri and INS Kirpan). Their sonar and radar transmissions identified them as warships, but PNS Hangor failed to intercept them due to the presence of Seaking Helicopters conducting independent ASW operation in the area. By 1900H, as the helicopters had left the area, PNS Hangor was already in position and the two Indian ASW frigates were approaching on a steady course with a narrow weave, at a speed of 12 knots. INS Khukri’s captain had ordered a slow speed to help improve the sonar’s detection range as per recommended by the officer monitoring the experimental project, despite this being against Indian antisubmarine doctrine. Undetected by the two ships, PNS Hangor fired a torpedo at INS Kirpan. The torpedo failed to explode, but was detected by INS Kirpan, who turned away and conducted evasive maneuvers. INS Khukri continued course towards PNS Hangor, who fired a second torpedo hitting and eventually sinking the former in just a matter of two to three minutes. INS Kirpan returned the following morning with another ship, INS Katchal, to rescue INS Khukri’s survivors. By then, 18 officers including the skipper, Captain Mulla who chose to go down with his ship and 176 sailors have already died due to the fateful incident and 66 others hanging on to their dear life amidst the cold and unforgiving waters of the Arabian Sea.
This Tales Emphasis. The 14th Frigate Squadron, normally consisted of three ships (INS Kirpan, INS Khukri and INS Kuthar), was crippled due to the ongoing repair of INS Kuthar in Bombay after suffering a boiler room explosion during one of its ASW protection operation of the western seaboard. Despite this predicament, there were no significant efforts to strengthen/ fortify the squadrons ASW capability before embarking into the hunter-killer mission. The squadron commander did not have ASW helicopters under his operational control. Apart from the hunter-killer operation, the squadron was also tasked to carry out a jibed mission of testing a technological project on its experimental stage, which was supposed to help enhance the ASW frigates sonar detection performance, something that is more than the calculated risk. Apart from these tactical and technical controversies, one of the highlights of this tale is the drama of life and death and tales of heroism and survival involving the officers and men of the ill-fated ship.
III. CRITIQUE/COMMENT
This book has been written to describe and narrate in the simplest but most vivid way possible, how the men and women of Indias defense force, particularly the Navy have sacrifice their own sweat and blood for the protection of every man on the street of India. As I went through the details of this book, I find myself so eager and unrelenting to get into one page after the other. The action, thrill, drama and the historical values embedded in the story captured my undivided attention that I actually finished reading the book in just one sitting. It was as if watching a movie in Full-HD widescreen with Dolby surround speakers where I could actually see the intense picture and hear for myself, the noise and chaos of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, the poor and hopeless site of INS Khukri going down the bottom of the Arabian Sea and the inner cry and crestfallen spirit of the survivors and those families of the fallen comrades who died during the sinking of the ill-fated warship.The book was indeed a replication of the actual drama of life and death during one of Indias most decisive battles. However, like any other blockbuster movies in the history of the film industries worldwide, controversies will always seek to find their way to stardom just like the leading actors and superstars of controversial stories and films. The only difference with this story was that the controversies were not showbiz in nature but of something that has to be seriously considered for the reason that this particular drama of life and death has actually claimed the lives of nearly 200 Navy servicemen and devastating their respective families forever. General Cardozo has, in all aspects, managed to write the book in a manner that is easier to understand and comprehend for a layman in the streets. He has even managed to let the readers see both sides of the coin, so to speak, as he had also unfolded relevant tales from the opponents perspective. As a foreigner who has so little appreciation of Indias defense force, reading this book has, somehow, accorded me with a birds eye view of Indias outlook as a nation, her morals and her aspirations. Indeed, the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War and the story of the sinking of INS Khukri is a manifestation of Indias boldness and firm resolve to pursue lasting peace and freedom for all.
Nonetheless, allow me still to express some of my concerns and comments of some gray areas which have come into my innocent attention being a novice in this field of study and who has relatively limited understanding of the Indian Navys battle perspective in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, to wit:
Where were the submarines of India during this particular war? The book never mentioned any account of Indian submarines seeing action during the war. More so, they were never mentioned supporting the ASW operations and submarine operations in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. I believe there were already four submarines in Indias inventory during the late 1960s namely INS Kalvari, INS Khanderi, INS Karanj and INS Kursura. Would the fate of INS Khukri, somehow, be reversed if these submarines have shown significant action in the Arabian Sea during the war?
What was the primary task of the ASW air component during the hunter-killer operations on 09 December 1971? The book says that several Seaking ASW helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft were also in the area during that fateful day to hunt for enemy submarines. If that was the case, how come they were not attached to the actual task force designated to perform the hunter-killer operation? Examining the books narration, INS Khukri and INS Kirpan only had each other as supporting units of the task force. No coordination, whatsoever, had been made between the air and surface assets prior and during the operation. Moreover, Captain Mulla, the task force commander, had not been made aware of the mission of these air assets flying in the same area where his task force was operating and performing the same operation that his task force was performing. Is it not a standard procedure that when a task force commander is tasked to carry out a mission, task units are placed under his control as supporting forces? Had this been done, the commander of the task force could have at least ensured that the helicopters are fully armed for the ASW operation and the helicopters would have been performing in a coordinated manner with the surface ships.

Why was the testing of an experimental device done during an actual combat operation? It was an uncontested fact that the sonars of the Indian ASW frigates were of no match to that of the Pakistani submarines sonars during that time of the war. A significant upgrade or a fitment of an enhanced sonar equipment for the Indian Navy would be very much appreciated. During that time, it was noted that several researches were being conducted in line with the sonar performance enhancement of Indian warships. What is irregular then was the fitment of a sonar equipment under a still experimental stage (means that the project was not yet completed and tested) to an Indian warship which was about to be deployed for an ASW crucial mission. It is quite ironic for the Headquarters to direct an equipment test run on real battle scenario where trial borne errors and miscalculations could actually mean uncalculated risks, loss of lives and damage to valuable properties. It could have been easier to understand if the Headquarters have set up some safety nets in exchange of the risk being taken in conducting the test run by providing sufficient air ASW support forces or augmenting submarine units in the task force.

When Kuthar was towed to Bombay, why was there no ASW force augmented to Khukri? It was related in the book that INS Kuthar, INS Khukri and INS Kirpan were doing escort mission with the Eastern Fleet on the early part of December 1971. During this run, INS Kuthar had experienced a major derangement requiring her to be towed back to Bombay. Relatedly, INS Kirpan carried out the towing operation leaving INS Khukri as the only ASW frigate who will be effectively monitoring for any hostile submarine contacts while en route to Bombay. With this scenario, it seemed to me that the Headquarters had long been putting, not only INS Khukri but also the two other ASW frigates, into harms way by not providing sufficient escort that will protect them from enemy submarine attack as they return to port in a crippled mode. It seemed to me that the Headquarters had already been rehearsing the fate of INS Khukri or even that of the two other ASW frigates even before the sinking of the poor ship actually happened.
Was the sunken ship ever found? Were there any efforts to recover the bodies after the war? The book had written several accounts pertaining to issues relative to the sinking of INS Khukri. Several arguments have also been raised over the Internet and other open sources. Ive even read several articles pertaining to a filed petition on the reinvestigation of the case of INS Khukri. Case in point was the petition for the revocation of the gallantry awards conferred to the skipper and several officers of INS Kirpan for alleged cowardice during the incident. This led me into thinking that there were no proper closure yet as to what really happened in 1971, so to speak. There had been no proper conclusion as to INS Khukris sinking. If the sunken ship had been found and efforts to get into the deeper details of what really happened in 1971 has been initiated, then I believe that controversies relative to the sinking of INS Khukri would have been put to rest right now together with the almost 200 souls of that ill-fated ship. Or, if the sunken ship had been found, were there reasonable efforts on the part of the Headquarters of the Navy to unfold what needs to be unfolded in this incident or was there some degree of reluctance? In a lighter and personal point of view, was there any efforts to locate the missing bodies of the servicemen who went down with their ship during that fateful night of 09 December 1971? This, I believe, could somehow alleviate their families sorrows and pain if at least their loved ones had returned home for a decent and solemn burial.
Again, these are the gray areas I was referring in the earlier part of my critique. I am made to understand, though, that the Headquarters of the Navy had already instituted inquiries pertaining to relevant issues at hand. As I read the story, I share in the sorrows of those who lost their loved ones who fought not just for their families freedom but for the whole Indian nations quest for lasting peace. Also, I share in the sentiments of those who seek for justice and truth amidst the silent turmoil that runs within the ranks of the Navy because of the controversies behind the sad fate of INS Khukri. After all, I truly agree with the author, General Cardozo when he said that It is easy to be wise after the event but one cannot get away from the fact that there were a number of faulty decisions that led to the destruction of the Khukri.

IV. CONCLUSION ; RECOMMENDATION
Finally, I would like to render my snappiest salute to General Cardozo for a splendid piece of literature that brought out the human element of the sea battles of 1971 Indo-Pakistan War and the rare accounts of the sinking of INS Khukri. As with most military history books, writers usually forgo stories of human interest and capitalize more on historical narratives. What is unique about this book is it offers both historical as well as descriptive accounts essential in answering the basic questions of every man on the street without the need of worrying so much on having to deal with profuse technical and military jargons. Indeed, this book shall bring the Indian defense force, particularly the Navy, closer to the public whom it has sworn to serve. The public has the right to be informed of the institutional health and welfare of the very force that protects and upholds their right to freedom and security. More so, the new breed of soldiers and sailors ought to know the gallantry and boldness of those who have gone before them and the many sacrifices offered by their forbearers just so they will live to fight and endure another day.
In a military perspective, I recommend this book for academic reading during the formative years of a candidate soldier, a cadet/midshipman and a watch-keeping seagoing officer. Meanwhile, in a civilian point of view, I see this book to be a potential blockbuster film in the movie industry with all the action, thrill and drama inert in each and every story that it holds. Hopefully, Bollywood and the Indian Navy would tie up in this rare but promising venture just like any other Indian war epics in the past such as the Storm Over Bengal in 1938, The Rising: Ballad of Mangal Pandey in 2005 and Last Day of the Raj in 2007 that had successfully made their way into the big screens.

Its definitely a great booka certified reading pleasure!
V. BIBLIOGRAPHY
MGen Cardozo, AVSM,SM, Ian The Sinking of INS Khukri (Survivors Stories), New Delhi: Lotus Collection and Roli Books Pvt. Ltd., 2006.