China?s Policy of Non-interference Faces Possible Modification ? A Cas (2211 words)
Introduction and Literature ReviewChina and Sudan have a historical trading partnership dating back to the early 1950s, while the oil partnership, one of the most important aspects of the bilateral relations, was begun in the 1990s amid war and tumult. The Chinese government has largely maintained its policy of non-interference in the nation, which helped to strengthen the bilateral partnership. The main purpose of China?s non-interference policy is to cultivate rich and peaceful soil for the development of economy. Sudan and South Sudan are currently attempting to come to an agreement over disputed territories, and China has (for the most part) upheld its policy of non-interference. However, with the violence and threats, the policy has been placed under increasing pressure because it is actually working against its main goal: economic development. The following words are some existing literature on the subject. Qiao Shitong (law professor) believes that in recent years, China?s non-interference policy has been under increasing pressure, especially from the Western community. However, he claims that the principle of non-interference is ultimately in China?s best interest to uphold, but that a few modifications may be required. He advocates what is called ?soft interference,? or making suggestions and giving verbal guidance on internal matters. Opposing views argue that China is far too economically invested in these conflicted nations to disentangle itself from the political turmoil. Also, the policy does little or nothing to allay the issues of establishing safe and secure environments for investment, according to Berger and Wissenbach, which is needed in order to engender development and growth. In this essay it is necessary to explain why China?s best option is to officially modify its policy of non-interference for relations with Sudan and South Sudan due to the tension the policy created, the threat of violence towards Chinese investments and workers (as both of these reasons are negatively affecting China?s economic growth), and the fact that China has not always stuck to the policy in the past.
Alienating South Sudan
The policy has had some negative backlash regarding China?s oil relations with the recently independent South Sudan, which undermines China?s energy security as well as potentially risks economic growth. Since the official Chinese stance is to recognize the official government in power in any given nation, before South Sudan became a nation the Chinese government did not recognize the government in Juba. China?s loyalty and official relations lay with the government in Khartoum. This caused initial relations to be quite rocky, and could very well have been the cause of directed violence towards Chinese workers. Moreover, some Southern Sudanese saw China?s non-interference as complicity with the north?s violence and human rights violations during the civil war. For this reason, there still exists much animosity towards China in South Sudan, especially over oil trading.
In February of this year, the South Sudanese government forced the Chinese head of a major oil company to leave the country over allegations of conspiring with Sudan to steal oil. Whether or not the allegations are true, this is a prime example of China being caught in the middle of the conflict, suffering negative consequences in South Sudan and potentially harming the bilateral relationship. Since it is China?s policy to have official relations with the regime in power, when the opposition manages to establish its own state and government (as in the case of South Sudan) there is a high likelihood of feelings of negativity toward China for its lack of support, or even opposition to the new regime.
Further evidence of the negative consequences can be seen in other countries. For example, the same violent backlash has also been seen in both Libya and Syria during the revolutions last year. China?s veto in the UN Security Council against intervention in Syria was seen by many in the Middle East as support for the current Assad regime. In Libya, many citizens and members of the new regime were angered by China?s supposed support of Gaddafi and the back and forth stance that China took, first supporting UN sanctions but later not supporting the NATO operations. There is ample evidence that the policy of non-interference has had negative consequences regarding bilateral relations between the newly-established South Sudan and China; the South Sudanese government has to power to force Chinese companies out if it feels they are too supportive of the government in Sudan. Should this happen, China would be facing a severe loss in energy security as well as severe economic loss. In order to avoid future complications, China needs to reassess the success of its policy when dealing with each country, as relations between Sudan and South Sudan continue to be tense.
Threat of Violence
The second and equally important reason supporting modification of the non-interference policy is that violence in the Sudanese region affects current Chinese investments and projects (i.e. a threat to economic gain). This is especially true of oil infrastructure and workers due to their locations in the conflicted region. For example, in January of this year over two dozen Chinese workers were captured (one worker was unfortunately killed during the attack) and held hostage by rebel fighters, interrupting work at the construction site and putting the lives of the workers at risk. This has not been the only violence directed at Chinese workers in the region. In 2004, two Chinese oil workers were taken by the Sudan Liberation Army, which alerted the Chinese leadership to the reality of the conflicted zone. In 2007, during the height of the Darfur conflict, Chinese-owned oil infrastructure was attacked by rebels, who asked for China?s withdrawal from Sudan. Also, just one year later in 2008, five Chinese oil workers were killed in the southern region of Sudan by rebel forces. The killings occurred after nine workers were taken hostage by rebel forces, accusing China of supporting measures in Khartoum that led to poor conditions in Southern Kordofan.
The major implication of this violence against Chinese workers and projects is economic loss. China cannot claim that there is no reason to become involved in the conflict, because it has already become a part of the conflict due to its workers being targeted, not to mention the fact that its revenue is at risk when operations are halted. The fact that China is invested so heavily in Sudan and South Sudan (especially in the oil sector) makes the protection even more important. The violence against Chinese citizens in Sudan, and Africa in general have caused many to be concerned about their safety abroad, as over twenty thousand Chinese are said to be residing in the Sudanese region. Again, Libya serves as a good example of how violence affects Chinese workers and investments in conflict-affected states. China lost billions of dollars in investments in Libya when the war broke out, and also resources had to be used in order to evacuate thousands of Chinese workers that were in harmful way. In order to avoid further economic losses that have been incurred due to the conflict, China must reconsider the success of its policy when dealing with each country, as the threat of its own economic benefits is still troubling.
Past Inconsistency
China has not completely upheld the principle in the past involving interstate conflict in Sudan. Historical relations with Khartoum had always been based upon the principle of non-interference, but the conflict in Darfur initiated a deviation from traditional policy. In the early 2000s, China became involved in the Darfur conflict that was taking place in Sudan. The Chinese government was attempted to persuade the Sudan government in Khartoum to end the violence by conducting private talks. But these efforts did not produce desired results, as the regime only became more resistant to pressure. Finally, China aided Western powers to pass a UNSC Resolution by refusing to vote on the issue. By not vetoing intervention, China allowed peacekeeping efforts to begin in the region, which could style as the soft intervention. During 2009, China also became more willing to openly criticize the government in Khartoum, and Hu Jintao even presented four principles he believed were needed to resolved the conflict.
This was an important step for China, as it had and continues to feel pressure from the international community to be a more responsible global power. More recently, in May, 2012, China voted in the UN Security Council in favor of a resolution which would allow the AU to impose sanctions should Sudan and South Sudan not begin to address the conflict peacefully, which could be valued as soft intervention. In this instance, China once again moved away from its traditional stance, as it usually abstains from voting in such matters. China, as had been said before, is seeking the culmination of their benefits in the way of participating in international community. Therefore, with China?s reliance upon Sudanese oil, it has had to bend this policy in order to forge a relationship with South Sudan, as a percentage of the oil fields and investments are located in the new nation. The prospect of losing economic benefits from the oil feud should be a large motivational factor for China to amend its policy.
Conclusion
China has embraced pragmatism as a guiding principle, and when a certain policy is threatening economic development, it becomes necessary to reexamine said policy (this is a rational move that any nation would make in order to maintain economic security). This is the current issue surrounding the non-interference principle. Economic benefits are sacred and inviolable, for it has close relationship with many other important issues, such as regional security and domestic development. Due to China?s growing economic involvement in Sudan and South Sudan, it will need to rethink its policy of non-interference because modification of the policy is necessary in order to protect its investments. Violence in the region continues even though Sudan and South Sudan are not officially engaged in war, because rebel groups are battling over the disputed central territories where many of the oil reserves lie. China cannot afford to invest in such a risky environment where the potential of returns are pendulous. The dispute between Sudan and South Sudan has also halted oil production, which is a major blow to Chinese investments as China relies on oil sales from Sudan for a large part of its energy sources; this means that China needs to become more active in helping with negotiations in order to save its stakes in the oil industry. To protect investments and economic security in the Sudanese region, China should consider modifying or perhaps even abandoning its current policy of non-interference and adopting one that will allow for more soft intervention.
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